interpretation of the Act. 7 Both cases involved regulation of wetlands that were adjacent to non-navigable tributaries of traditional navigable waters, and the Carabell case involved regulation of a wetland that was separated from a tributary by a berm. While all of the Justices rejected the Rapanos' argument that Federal jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act is limited to waters that are navigable in fact, 8 the Court was unable to reach consensus on the scope of jurisdiction over non-navigable tributaries and wetlands adjacent to those tributaries. The Justices did not issue a majority opinion in the cases, although a four Justice plurality, and Justice Kennedy, in a concurrence, agreed that the Corps' regulation of the wetlands could not be justified based on the rationales articulated below, and that the cases should be remanded to determine whether Federal regulation of the wetlands at issue was appropriate. The two major questions addressed in most of the opinions were (1) whether non-navigable tributaries are "waters of the United States" under the Clean Water Act (Rapanos); and (2) whether wetlands that are hydrologically separated from a tributary are "adjacent" to those waters (Carabell) .
Although the cases before the court specifically involved the "waters of the United States" and the associated scope of federal jurisdiction over non-navigable tributaries of navigable waters is likely to have much broader impacts on other Clean Water Act programs.
The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, and the Chief Justice, adopted the narrowest interpretation of the Clean Water Act. Relying on a textualist reading of the statute, Justice Scalia concluded that "waters of the United States" includes "only those relatively permanent, standing or continuously flowing bodies of water 'forming geographic features' that are described in ordinary parlance as 'streams . . . oceans, rivers [and] lakes. The phrase does not include channels through which water flows intermittently or ephemerally, or channels that periodically provide drainage for 7 . For a compilation of documents related to both case (including the original Corps application and enforcement documents), see Kim Diana Connolly, United States Supreme Court Rapanos and Carabell Wetlands Cases at http:// www.law.sc.edu/wetlands/rapanos-carabell/.
8. See, e.g., 126 S. Ct. at 2220 (plurality recognized that "navigable waters" is broader than the traditional understanding of the term); id. at 2241 (Justice Kennedy, in concurrence, remarked that the term includes "some waters that are not navigable in the traditional sense"); id. at 2255-56 (dissenting opinion).
regulation of wetlands, the focus of the various opinions on the definition of http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/04-01384qp.pdf (Rapanos).
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/qp/04-01384qp.pdf (Carabell) and
The questions presented for the cases can be found at 8a. rainfall." 9 Although the plurality conceded that the term could include some streams, rivers, or lakes that do not flow continuously throughout a year, their opinion provided little guidance regarding when that would be appropriate. 10 The plurality also argued that the wetlands in the cases could not be regulated as "adjacent" wetlands, in accordance with the Court's Riverside Bayview holding. 11 Justice Scalia wrote that "only those wetlands with a continuous surface connection to bodies that are 'waters of the United States' in their own right, so that there is no clear demarcation between 'waters' and wetlands 'adjacent to' such waters, are covered by the Act. Wetlands with only an intermittent, physically remote hydrologic connection to 'waters of the United States' do not implicate the boundary-drawing problem of Riverside Bayview, and thus lack the necessary connection to covered waters that we described as a 'significant nexus' in SWANCC." 12 Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion that reads much more like a dissenting opinion, rejected the plurality's narrow interpretations of "waters of the United States" and "adjacent," chastised the plurality for the tone of its opinion, 13 but agreed with the plurality that the lower court's decision should be vacated and the case should be remanded. 14 Focusing on the purposes of the Clean Water Act, Justice Kennedy argued that the plurality's "permanent standing or continuously flowing" requirement made "little practical sense in a statute concerned with downstream water quality." 15 Regarding "adjacency," Kennedy noted that the plurality's "surface connection" test was rejected in Riverside Bayview, was not supported by SWANCC, and was inconsistent with the purposes of the Clean Water Act. 16 According to Justice Kennedy, whether wetlands can be regulated under the Clean Water Act depends upon the existence of a significant nexus between the wetlands in question and navigable waters in the traditional sense. . . .With respect to wetlands, the rationale for Clean Water Act regulation is, as the Corps has recognized, that wetlands can 9 Notably, Justice Kennedy's test does not always require a hydrological connection between the wetlands and traditional navigable waters, as long as there is a "significant nexus" between the wetlands and the navigable waters. 18 Applying the "significant nexus" test, Justice Kennedy first concluded that regulation of wetlands adjacent to navigable-in-fact waters is clearly justified under the Clean Water Act. 19 He was concerned, however, that the Corps' definition of "tributaries," which can include nonnavigable drains, ditches, and streams remote from navigable in fact waters, was sufficiently broad that there may be situations where wetlands that are adjacent to tributaries of waters that are navigable in fact may not have a significant nexus to those waters. 20 Accordingly, Justice Kennedy encouraged the Corps to identify, by regulation, "categories of tributaries that, due to their volume of flow. . .their proximity to navigable waters, or other significant considerations, are significant enough that wetlands adjacent to them are likely, in the majority of cases, to perform important functions for an aquatic system incorporating navigable waters." 21 In the absence of regulations though, Kennedy asserted that federal agencies "must establish a significant nexus [to a navigable-infact water] on a case-by-case basis when [ Justice Stevens wrote a dissenting opinion in the case, joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. This dissent, which received the same number of votes as the plurality, shared some analytical similarities to Justice Kennedy's concurrence. The dissenters argued that the Supreme Court previously upheld the regulation of wetlands adjacent to tributaries of navigable waters in Riverside Bayview. 24 If the case was not controlled by Riverside Bayview, the dissenters argued that because the Clean Water Act is ambiguous regarding jurisdiction over wetlands that are adjacent to non-navigable tributaries, the Court should defer, under Chevron v. NRDC, 25 to the Corps' reasonable interpretation of the statute. 26 Not surprisingly, the dissenters argued that the "continuously flowing" and "continuous surface connection" requirements of the plurality were not consistent with the text or purposes of the Clean Water Act. 27 The dissenters also did not feel that it should be necessary to demonstrate a "significant nexus" between wetlands and navigable in fact waters in every case in which jurisdiction is asserted. They argued that the nexus requirement, if it exists at all, "is categorically satisfied as to wetlands adjacent to navigable waters or their tributaries." 28 Justice Kennedy's approach, the dissenters lamented, "will have the effect of creating additional work for all concerned parties. Developers. . .will have no certain way of knowing whether they need to get 404 permits or not. And the Corps will have to make case-by-case (or category-by-category) jurisdictional determinations, which will inevitably increase the time and resources spent processing permit applications." 29 The implications of the fractured opinions in the Rapanos and Carabell cases for federal regulation of non-navigable tributaries and wetlands adjacent to those tributaries are unclear. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in a separate concurring opinion, "no opinion commands a majority of the Court on precisely how to read Congress' limits on the reach of the Clean One potential response to the Rapanos litigation, although unlikely, is a legislative clarification of the scope of "waters of the United States" under the Clean Water Act. While the plurality was concerned that the regulation of non-navigable tributaries and adjacent wetlands could raise Commerce Clause or federalism concerns, 35 neither Justice Kennedy nor the four dissenting Justices agreed that those were valid concerns. 36 Thus, Congress could amend the law to explicitly authorize regulation of those waters. Shortly after the Court issued its opinions in the Rapanos litigation, several environmental groups began campaigning heavily for passage of the Clean Water Authority Restoration Act, 37 which would redefine "waters of the United States" as "all waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide, the territorial seas, and all interstate and intrastate waters and their tributaries, including lakes, rivers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats, wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, natural ponds, and all impoundments of the foregoing, to the fullest extent that these waters, or activities affecting these waters, are subject to the legislative power of Congress under the Constitution." 38 There is a competing proposal pending before Congress, the Federal Wetlands Jurisdiction Act, 39 which would narrow the statute's definition of federally regulated waters to those that are traditionally navigable, and their adjacent wetlands. As of early October 2006, no pending bill has received a hearing.
There has, however, been one post-decision hearing. 41 In the absence of legislative clarification, the Corps and EPA could promulgate regulations that clarify when non-navigable tributaries and wetlands adjacent to those tributaries will be regulated as "waters of the United States" in light of Rapanos. The Chief Justice, in his separate concurring opinion, chastised the government for abandoning the previous rulemaking proceeding that would have defined "waters of the United States." 42 Had the government proceeded by regulation, Roberts asserted, it would have been "afforded generous leeway by the courts in interpreting" the Clean Water Act under Chevron. 43 Justice Kennedy also suggested that the agency could use rulemaking to identify categories of tributaries that could be regulated as "waters of the United States" in order to avoid making "significant nexus" decisions on a case-by-case basis in adjudication. 44 Finally, Justice Breyer wrote a separate dissenting opinion, in which he argued that the scientific questions involved in determining the scope of "waters of the United States" should be resolved by agencies through rulemaking, rather than by the courts on an ad hoc basis. 45 issuing guidance, rather than by promulgating a rule. 48 Even with such guidance, though, for the foreseeable future, government agencies will need to spend more time and resources in processing permit applications, developers will have less certainty regarding whether permits are necessary under Section 404, and courts, facing an increase in 404 litigation, will need to "feel their way on a case-by-case basis." 49 Early cases interpreting the decision focus on Justice Kennedy's concurrence. For example, the Ninth Circuit held that the City of Healdsburg, California is required to obtain a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit to discharge sewage into a rock quarry pit filled with water from an aquifer adjacent to the Russian River. 50 The Ninth Circuit held that Justice Kennedy's Rapanos opinion is now the "controlling rule of law" in this area and that to qualify as a navigable water under the Clean Water Act (CWA), a body of water itself need not be continually flowing but that there must be a "significant nexus" to a waterway that is in fact navigable. 51 Applying that test to the trial court's findings of fact in Healdsburg, the Court concluded that the pit, known as Basalt Pond, and its wetlands possess a "significant nexus" to waters that are navigable in fact and, therefore, trigger the Clean Water Act because the Pond waters seep directly into the Russian River, a traditionally navigable water. 52 As noted in the introduction to this addendum-and it is a point worth repeating-the Rapanos decision is not limited to wetlands issues. 51 Id. 52. Id. 53. The term "navigable waters" is used more than 90 times in the Clean Water Act, and is defined in Section 502 of the Act as meaning "the waters of the United States, including the territorial seas." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). The United States Army Corps of Engineers has provided a long-standing regulatory definition of "waters of the United States" to implement this provision for purposes of Section 404 of the Act. 33 C.F.R. § 328. 3. questions under the CWA. Although Rapanos focused on whether an adjacent wetland was jurisdictional, the underlying issue was whether the small creeks and ditches that connect the wetland to a navigable-infact water body are themselves protected by the CWA. It is that underlying issue that holds the key to the decision's importance beyond wetlands. In other words, if those small creeks and ditches are not "waters," not only are they not regulated under section 404, but they potentially lose all of the other protections afforded by the CWA.
These other protections are what make Rapanos significant beyond wetlands protection. For example, if small creeks and ditches are not covered by the Act, factories and other traditional point source dischargers arguably could discharge to them without an NPDES permit. 54 It is not uncommon for industrial and municipal waste water sources to discharge directly into a small creek or irrigation ditch that may or may not fall within the plurality's or Kennedy's tests for jurisdiction. The types of water bodies that may fall outside the jurisdiction of the CWA under the plurality or Kennedy tests, such as very small perennial creeks or intermittent and ephemeral streams, are common everywhere, and abound in the arid west. 55 Also, in the arid west, many concentrated animal feeding operations ("CAFOs") sit on irrigation canals. Justice Scalia's plurality opinion clearly was troubled with asserting CWA jurisdiction over ditches. But water flows downstream, and given the long life span of pollutants such as E. coli 0157:H7, Salmonella, and Cryptosporidium, all of which are common pollutants in feed lots discharges, 56 these pollutants will surely enter downstream navigable-in-fact water bodies. If these ditches are not "waters," then one question that is raised is whether CAFOs and other point sources discharging to them are still subject to the restrictions of the CWA. One can argue that the ditches are a "conveyance to 'waters of the United States,'" but authority for the "conveyance" argument is not clear under the CWA, and the case law will have to be developed.
Similarly, if one alters the fundamental reach of the CWA by changing how we define "waters of the United States," many other questions 54 arise. For example, if a small creek is effluent dominated, 57 but the stream would dry up naturally (i.e., without the added flow from the point source) during parts of the year, does it meet the "relatively permanent body of water" test put forward by the plurality? Will all section 303(d) listed water bodies that do not meet the plurality or Kennedy tests fall off the impaired waters list? What happens to Total Maximum Daily Load ("TMDL") 58 waste load allocations that included waste loads from tributaries that were formerly jurisdictional but now may not be under Rapanos? Any point source on that formerly jurisdictional tributary would arguably be freed of the waste load allocation assigned to its NPDES permit. That would, in turn, have a ripple effect on all of the other allocations in the TMDL. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) waste treatment exclusion exempts from RCRA regulation discharges covered under the NPDES program. 59 If no NPDES permits are required for intermittent and ephemeral streams or streams with no "significant nexus" to navigable waters, do these discharges lose their RCRA exemptions? Will states lose much of their oversight authority over federal permits under section 401 by losing the ability to issue 401 certifications for federal permits on water bodies that are no longer considered "waters?" Will a storm water discharge to a sewer system that leads to a navigable water still be considered a point source discharge? Many questions arise when one starts fiddling with the definition of "waters."
It is impossible to predict at this point how all of the questions in the previous paragraph and numerous other as-yet unforeseen questions will be answered. In addition to the dramatically increased workload that the agencies will be facing in the coming year at least, one other thing is certain. There will be much litigation interpreting the 2006 United States Supreme Court Rapanos decision.
57. An effluent dominated stream is one where the effluent makes up most of the flow of the stream. This is common where a municipality's sewage treatment plan discharges to a creek.
58. 3 were authorized by the general permitting program authorized pursuant to Section 404(e). 4 Of those general permits, 34,114, or 38 percent, were nationwide permits. 5 By statute, the Corps' general permits are limited to categories of activities involving discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States that are similar in nature and cause only minimal adverse environmental effects when performed separately and considered cumulatively. 6 In late September 2006, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia issued a long-awaited ruling 7 regarding the 2000/2002 nationwide permit issuance. 8 Members of the permitted community 9 had sued the Corps, asserting that the NWPs as issued exceeded the Corps authority. 10 The court held that the Corps "adequately explained its rea-soning behind its issuance of the NWPs and [general conditions] and clearly acted within its authority." 11 This decision took many years to resolve, and the decision was issued toward the end of the life of the current NWPs, which by Congressional design expire every five years. 12 The current NWPs expire on March 18, 2007. 13 In fact, a few days before the D.C. District Court decision, the Corps 14 released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding the next round of NWPs. 15 One goal of the Corps in proposing these revisions to the NWPs is "to revise the text of the NWPs, general conditions, and definitions so that they are clearer, more concise, and can be more easily understood by the regulated public, government personnel, and interested parties, while retaining terms and conditions that protect the aquatic environment." 16 Rapanos decision 18 by the United States Supreme Court, 19 and states that "the discussion that follows applies to all ephemeral and intermittent streams and adjacent wetlands that remain jurisdictional following Rapanos." 20 Thousands of comments are expected on these proposed NWPs, which should be finalized in early 2007.
The Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) and Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have issued regulations 5 and guidance documents, 6 as well as entered into a Memorandum of Agreement, 7 to provide direction as to how to accomplish compensatory mitigation in the wetlands permitting context. These mitigation requirements have, however, been the subject of criticism 8 and debate in recent years. In fact, various federal agencies came together in 2002 to form a National Wetlands Mitigation Action Plan 9 to address mitigation issues. 10 This Plan included the development of various guidance documents and other concrete action items to assist in better implementation of mitigation goals. 11 Progress on many aspects of the National Wetlands Mitigation Action Plan stalled, however, when Congress, in the National Defense Authorization Act for 2004, 12 called on the Corps to promulgate new mitigation regulations. Although the legislation required the new regulations to be finalized by November 2005, the Corps and EPA did not
